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W HEN IT COMES TO THE QUESTION OF WHICH RULES of international law apply to international straits in times of naval 
armed conflict, one has to distinguish between straits bordered by at least one 
of the parties to an international armed conflict and straits bordered by States 
that are not directly involved in the hostilities. Although the law of maritime 
neutrality-let alone the general law of neutrality-is far from settled, the 
latter situation will, for reasons of convenience, be described as the legal status 
of neutral straits.1 
Straits are comparatively narrow natural passageways between one part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas, 
or exclusive economiczone.2 Artificial passageways must be distinguished from 
straits. In particular, they are not governed by the international law applicable 
to straits, but rather (and if at all) by special treaty provisions. That being so, for 
the purposes of the present study it is important to note the following 
provisions. 
• With respect to the Panama Canal, the Treaty of 7 September 19773 
provides that "in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure and 
open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire 
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equality .... Vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of all nations shall at all times 
be entitled to transit the Canal, irrespective of their internal operation, means 
of propulsion, origin, destination or armament."4 
• Pursuant to the Treaty of Constantinople of29 October 1888,5 "the Suez 
maritime canal shall always be free and open, in time of war and in time of 
peace, to every vessel of commerce or war, without distinction of the flag."6 
• Pursuant to Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Kiel Canal is open 
to all vessels flying the flags of States not at war with Germany.7 
The Legal Status of Belligerent International Straits 
As far as international straits of the parties to an international armed 
conflict are concerned, neither those not completely overlapped by territorial 
sea nor straits governed by "long,standing international conventions," will be 
dealt with here in depth.8 In the case of the former, a route through the high 
seas or through an exclusive economic zone will usually exist. Hence, littoral 
States are not bound by the special rules and principles applicable to 
international straits.9 In the case of the latter, there is only one international 
convention explicitly dealing with the situation of a littoral State being party to 
an ongoing armed conflict.1o According to Articles 1, 2,4, and 5 of the 20 July 
1936 Montreux Convention, all neutral vessels enjoy the right of transit 
passage, as long as they travel through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by 
daytime, refrain from supporting Turkey's enemies, and respect sea lanes 
designated by the Turkish authorities. However, there is no provision 
restricting the transit right of Turkish warships. Rather, Article 20 provides: 
En temps de guerre, la Turquie etant belligerante, les dispositions des articles 10 
a 18 ne seront pas applicables; Ie passage des batiments de guerre sera 
entierement laisse a la discretion du Gouvemement turc. 
Thus if Turkey is a belligerent the same rules apply as in international straits 
not governed by a special treaty regime. 
Suspension of the Right of Transit Passage in Time of Armed Conflict? The 
territorial seas of the parties to an international armed conflict are part of the 
general area of hostilities. Therefore, at first glance there seem to exist no 
restrictions on the conduct of hostilities in and over international straits 
completely overlapped by the territorial seas of the parties to an international 
armed conflict. Indeed, subject to the applicable maritime jus in bello, enemy 
vessels and aircraft in such straits may be attacked, and enemy and neutral 
264 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 
merchant vessels may be visited, stopped, and captured.ll Of particular 
note, the littoral State is entitled to deny all enemy vessels and aircraft the 
right of transit passage.12 In view of the economic interests involved,13 
however, it is a matter of dispute whether such straits may also be closed to 
the shipping of States not parties to the conflict, i.e., neutral shipping.14 
In the course of the deliberations at the 1907 Second Hague Peace 
Conference on Convention VIII, a proposal by the Netherlands on a 
comprehensive prohibition of mining international straits was rejected.1s 
Another, seeking a prohibition on the complete closing of an international 
strait by mines, also failed.16 Therefore, although a number of delegates 
expressed sympathy for such proposals, Hague Convention VIII lacks any 
provision on the mining of international straitsY During the Second World 
\Var, numerous international straits were mined.1s Yet during the first two 
years of the war this closure was not complete. In the respective proclamations 
of danger zones, either peaceful shipping was referred to or piloting services or 
safe passages were designated, thus enabling peaceful shipping to transit the 
straits relatively unmolested.19 Still, in view of the total character of this war in 
the years following, these examples are insufficient to prove the existence of a 
prohibition on entirely closing international straits. State practice after 1945 
also reveals that if States bordering an international strait are parties to an 
international armed conflict, they are inclined to close it even to peaceful 
shipping; they are not prepared to tolerate the dangers otherwise involved.20 
It seems, however, that a total closure of international straits, especially 
by naval mines, is inconsistent with the 9 April 1949 judgement of the 
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel caseY As is well 
known, the Court, in view of the state of war alleged by Greece, 
acknowledged Albania's right to restrict the passage of warships. It 
emphasized, however, that this may not lead to "prohibiting such passage or 
subjecting it to requirements of special authorization. lin Recent state 
practice also indicates the existence of a rule prohibiting the suspension of 
the right of transit passage, even during an international armed conflict. At 
the beginning of the first Gulf War, Iran explicitly acknowledged its legal 
duty to keep open those parts of the Strait of Hormuz23 overlapped by its 
territorial sea.24 When Iran proclaimed a war zone in that sea area and 
closed it to international shipping, the international community, because of 
the overall importance of this strait for international oil trade, reacted with 
vehement protests.25 In particular, the United States maintained that the 
right of transit passage remains unaffected by the fact that the bordering 
States are involved in an international armed conflict.26 
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These statements and protests imply that the right of transit passage through 
and over international straits as laid down in Article 38 of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) is both customary in character and 
binding upon States parties to an international armed conflict.27 Further 
evidence in favor of the customary character of a comprehensive and 
non;suspendable right of transit passage is Article 16, paragraph 4, of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.28 
According to that provision there "shall be no suspension of the innocent 
passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or 
the territorial sea of a foreign State." Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the 
right of transit passage applies especially to straits that have lost their high seas 
character because of an expansion of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles.29 
In all likelihood, without compensation in the form of the right of transit passage, 
the legal status of international straits would not have been settled.30 Finally, the 
Commander's Handbook of the U.S. Navy (N\VP 1;14M) provides that naval 
mines may be employed "to channelize neutral shipping, but not in a manner to 
deny transit passage of international straits [ .•. ] by such shipping.,,3! 
On the other hand, it must be remembered that some States neither 
acknowledge the customary character of Article 38 of the LOS Convention,32 
nor agree with its applicability in times of armed conflict. At the beginning of the 
deliberations on the Convention, a number of delegations, while pleading for a 
transit right for vessels in international straits, were hesitant to accept a right of 
overflight as well.33 In contrast to NWP 1;14M, the German Handbook, in 
section 1042 on mining, provides that "the shipping lanes of neutral and 
non;belligerent States shall be kept open to an appropriate extent, if military 
circumstances so permit.,,34 This view is obviously shared by Denmark.35 
It follows from the foregoing that State practice is conclusive only to the extent 
that, in principle, neutral vessels, i.e., warships and merchant vessels,36 may not be 
denied the right of transit passage (or of non;suspendable innocent passage) in 
international straits belonging to the parties to an international armed conflict.37 
However, there is also a tendency towards restriction of this right.38 Unfortunately, 
it is far from clear under which conditions the littoral belligerent State should be 
allowed to so restrict it. Of course, one possibility is denial to neutral submarines of 
the right to transit a belligerent strait submerged.39 This restriction could be 
justified by the legitimate interest of the belligerent littoral States in being fully 
informed of sea traffic in its coastal waters. The interests of the neutral flag States 
would be infringed upon only insignificantly, especially in view of the technical 
difficulties of identifying submerged objects.40 Still, because of its inconclusiveness, 
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no further conclusions relating to restrictions on the neutral States' right of 
transit passage can be drawn from State practice. In any event, the reasons 
justifying any limitation of this right must be of considerable weight-for 
example, overwhelming considerations of national securityY This follows from 
the fact that the law of both naval warfare and maritime neutrality has to be 
considered to be of an exceptional legal order.42 
The Right of Overflight. The foregoing principles cannot, as such, be applied to 
the right of overflight that Article 38.1 of the LOS Convention includes in 
transit passageY While NWP 1-14M contains a prohibition of entirely mining 
international straits, no provision addresses closure of the airspace above an 
international strait.44 Of course, enemy military aircraft entering the airspace 
above an international strait overlapped by the belligerent coastal State's 
territorial sea may be attacked, and enemy civilian aircraft may be forced to 
land and be subjected to capture.45 In principle, neutral aircraft are entitled to 
continue with their normal operations, but if they enter that airspace they do so 
at their own risk.46 Still, an unlimited application of the peacetime rules on 
overflight in time of armed conflict would meet considerable practical 
difficulties. Aircraft move much faster than ships. The Vincennes incident is but 
one demonstration of the difficulties involved in the identification of aircraft 
within a limited period of time.47 In view of the potential threat posed by 
aircraft, parties to an international armed conflict will hardly be willing to allow 
neutral air traffic to continue using the airspace above their international 
straits. Hence, there seem to be good reasons for a belligerent right to restrict or 
even suspend the right of overflight by neutral air traffic in the airspace above 
international straits in time of armed conflict. Indeed, in State practice there 
are some indications that during an international armed conflict coastal States 
reserve a right to close entirely the airspace above international straits 
overlapped by their territorial seas.4S This practice, however, is not sufficient to 
prove either the nonexistence or existence of an unlimited right of overflight by 
neutral aircraft in time of armed conflict. Therefore, the legality of a restriction 
of transit passage by neutral aircraft can only be judged, ifit can be judged at all, 
ex post in light of the jus ad bellum. 
The Legal Status of Neutral International Straits 
Neutral International Straits to Which the Right of Transit Passage Applies. 
The Second Hague Peace Conference. The legal status of neutral international 
straits was dealt with aHhe Second Hague Peace Conference, in the context of 
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the rights and duties of neutral States in naval war. In 1894, the Institut de 
Droit International had proposed a rule according to which "les detroits qui 
servent de passage d'une mer libre a une autre mer libre, ne peuvent jamais etre 
fermes." The Swedish delegate to the Second Hague Peace Conference 
referred to that proposal in these terms: "Si Ie droit des neutres d'interdire 
l'acd!s de ses eaux territoriales aux navires de guerre et aux prises est consacre 
comme Ie porte la proposition britannique article 30, il faudrait ajouter a cette 
disposition une exception du meme contenu que la resolution de l'Institut.,,4'l 
The Danish delegate proposed an amendment by which the provisions of 
Hague Convention XIII were not to be understood "de fa!;on a prohiber en 
temps de guerre Ie passage simple des eaux neutres, unissant deux mers libres 
par un navire de guerre ou navire auxiliaire d'un belligerant.,,5o Both proposals 
were aimed at denying neutral States the right to close their territorial seas if 
they formed part of an international strait. The contrary view was taken by the 
Ottoman and Japanese delegates, who wanted to treat international straits in 
the same manner as other coastal waters.51 In the end, the legal status of 
neutral international straits remained unsettled, even though the Third 
Committee in its report to the plenary had come to the conclusion that "la 
formule adoptee ... ne tranche nullement les questions precedentes, laissees 
sous l' empire du droit des gens general.,,52 Still, it is doubtful that by 1907 a rule 
to that effect was in existence.s3 Although only Japan had explicitly rejected a 
prohibition on closing neutral international straits, the lack of willingness 
amongst the other delegates to agree upon a special provision on straits cannot 
be ignored.54 
State Practice. State practice during international armed conflicts before 
1945 was also inconclusive with regard to the existence of a general and 
comprehensive legal duty of neutral States to keep their international straits 
open.55 Only the Scandinavian States allowed belligerent merchant vessels and 
warships to transit their international straits and, if they had laid mines there, 
offered piloting services.56 In addition, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
and Sweden, in the Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar Rules of 
Neutrality of 27 May 1938,57 promised to keep their international straits open 
to belligerent warships.58 These examples are insufficient to prove the 
existence of a customary rule.59 On the contrary, other States, like Germany, 
believed that there existed no rule of customary or treaty law obliging neutral 
States to let belligerent merchant vessels freely transit neutral international 
straits.6o 
Relevant state practice since 1945 is also predominantly restricted to 
Scandinavian States,61 which, by acts of national legislation, have more or less 
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clearly shown their willingness to keep their international straits open for 
belligerent warships, merchant vessels, and aircraft.62 Some authors claim the 
existence of a general rule of customary law to that effect.63 Unfortunately, they 
ignore the fact that such a claim must be based on a general practice 
accompanied by a corresponding opinio juris. Moreover, the question of 
whether the transit of belligerent warships is in accordance with the neutral 
status of the littoral State has to be clearly distinguished from that of whether a 
neutral State is entitled to deny transit through or over its international strait 
to belligerent warships, merchant vessels, or aircraft. Therefore, despite 
assertions to the contrary, one must conclude that until the end of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1982, 
there existed no customary rule prohibiting the total closure of international 
straits by neutral coastal States. 
The Influence of the International Law of the Sea. So far, we have not taken 
into consideration the progressive development of the international law on 
international straits initiated by the codifications of the law of the sea, 
especially by the LOS Convention. As already mentioned, Article 16.4 of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
provides that there "shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign 
ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one 
part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a 
foreign State."64 Since it was up to the coastal State to determine the 
innocence of passage, the question arose of whether it was entitled to require 
foreign warships to leave the strait should they fail to comply with the laws and 
regulations of the coastal State. Other unresolved issues include the right of 
submarines to transit straits submerged and the duty of foreign military aircraft 
to obtain prior admittance from the coastal State for overflight.65 
These problems were partly solved by UNCLOS III, especially because 
extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles did not allow the issue of 
international straits to be left unregulated.66 Now the right of transit passage 
applies in international straits that are overlapped by the territorial seas of the 
littoral States.67 According to Article 38.2 of the LOS Convention, transit 
passage that "shall not be impeded"6S is "the exercise of the freedom of 
navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious 
transit of the strait." While exercising the right of transit passage, ships and 
aircraft must proceed without delay; refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the 
bordering State, or in any other manner violate the principles of international 
law embodied in the United Nations Charter; and limit activities to those 
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incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit, unless 
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.69 Moreover, according to 
Article 39.2, ships in transit shall comply with "generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices" for safety at sea and for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships. This means that 
they are obliged to observe the conventions concluded under the auspices of 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO).70 Aircraft in transit passage 
shall observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO).71 Finally, the littoral State is entitled to 
designate sea lanes and to prescribe traffic separation schemes.72 However, 
such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact among 
foreign ships, or in their application have the practical effect of denying or 
impairing the right of transit passageY This implies that the right of transit 
passage will remain unaffected, even if the vessel or aircraft in transit passage 
violates the regulations adopted by the littoral State.74 
In view of the customary character of these provisions, we may draw the 
conclusion that warships and military aircraft enjoy an unimpeded right of 
transit passage.75 Submarines, because of the reference to "normal modes" in 
Article 39.1 (c), may transit international straits submerged.76 The littoral 
States' duty not to infringe upon this right is incumbent on them not only in 
time of peace but also during an international armed conflict at sea if they are 
not parties.77 If the parties to an international armed conflict may restrict or 
suspend the right of transit passage only in exceptional cases, then, a fortiori, 
States not parties to the conflict must be subject to even stricter limitations. 
This conclusion is verified by recent State practice. During the Iran,Iraq 
conflict, transit through or over the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian and the 
Iraqi armed forces was in no way restricted by Oman. The military manuals of 
the U.S. Navy,78 Canada,79 and the Federal Republic of GermanyBo also provide 
that neutral States are not entitled to restrict or suspend the transit of 
belligerent warships and military aircraft, or to submit them to stricter 
regulations than those applicable to vessels and aircraft of other States.B1 
Moreover, the continuing validity of the right of transit passage is an 
appropriate means to meet the object and purpose of the law of neutrality.82 
Hence, Rauch correctly states: 
One of the advantages of the new transit passage concept is that it keeps the 
littoral States bordering straits with great strategic value out of the vicious circle 
of escalation in times of tension and crisis. If transit through such straits were 
subject to the discretion of the coastal States, they would unavoidably become 
involved, even if the discretionary power were to be exercised evenhandedly, i.e., 
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even if they meticulously abided by the rule that all restrictions or prohibitions 
have to be applied impartially to the belligerents. The ramifications of a refusal or 
of a permission of transit in whole or in part--e.g., only surface navigation, or 
surface and submerged navigation, or navigation and overflight-could, albeit 
legally non.discriminatory, in fact be of quite different military and strategic 
value to the parties to the conflict.83 
As in time of peace, however, belligerent warships in transit must properly 
respect designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes and must proceed 
without delay.s4 They may not carry out any research or survey activities 
without the prior authorization of the bordering States.55 The prohibition on 
the threat or use of force against the littoral State is complemented by the 
relevant prohibitions of the law of maritime neutrality as laid down in the 1907 
Hague Convention XllI and as found in customary law.s6 In particular, 
belligerent warships and military aircraft may neither take hostile actions nor 
use these sea areas as a base of operations.S7 Military aircraft must respect safety 
regulations and have due regard for the safety of air traffic.B8 In view of their 
sovereign immunity, belligerent warships are not bound by the provisions of the 
LOS Convention on the protection of the marine environment. 
While submarines may pass through neutral international straits submerged, 
it is not quite clear which additional measures belligerent warships and military 
aircraft in transit may take.89 According to the Canadian Draft Manual, they 
may transit a neutral strait "in an appropriate state of readiness with 
appropriate sensors activated.,,90 NWP I-14M provides that "belligerent forces 
in transit may, however, take defensive measures consistent with their security, 
including the launching and recovery of aircraft, screen formation steaming, 
and acoustic and electronic surveillance.,,91 Military aircraft may "engage in 
activities that are consistent with their security and the security of 
accompanying surface and subsurface forces.,,92 The same rules can be found in 
the San Remo Manua1.93 The use of acoustic and electronic sensors must be 
considered a normal activity of warships and military aircraft, especially during 
armed conflict, an activity that is not to be equated with "research and survey 
activities" in the sense of Article 40 of the LOS Convention. Otherwise, their 
security would be intolerably jeopardized.94 
There remain some doubts as to whether the other measures mentioned in 
section 7.3.5 ofNWP I-14M are compatible with the duty of continuous and 
expeditious transit.95 Since there is no relevant State practice that would allow 
conclusions regarding the current state of the law, one cannot but consider 
such activities as in accordance with the applicable law if they do not: 
(1) endanger the safety of navigation within the strait; (2) present a threat or 
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use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political 
independence of the neutral littoral State in a way incompatible with the laws 
of neutrality; or (3) unreasonably exceed what is necessary for a continuous 
and expeditious transit.96 As regards the use of military aircraft, this may not 
result in a use of neutral waters or airspace as a base of operations. Thus, 
attacks may not be conducted by military aircraft launched from warships 
within neutral international straits.97 Within and over neutral territorial seas, 
all hostile actions by belligerent forces are prohibited. The fact that parts of a 
neutral's territorial sea form an international strait does not alter anything. The 
right of transit passage implies only that the neutral littoral State is prohibited 
from closing an international strait to belligerent warships and military aircraft; 
it does not mean that the coastal State's sovereignty is no longer protected. 
It needs to be emphasized that the foregoing principles only apply to 
offensive operations. As seen, according to NWP 1,14M and the San Remo 
Manual "defensive measures consistent with their security" would not be 
contrary to the inviolability of the neutral State's sovereignty. During the 
discussions on the San Remo Manual there "seemed to be general agreement 
that because of the dangers of unlawful attack on a transiting unit by an 
opposing belligerent which might ignore its duty to respect the neutrality of the 
State bordering the strait, . . . the transiting unit should be allowed to go 
through in a high state of readiness and should be able to adopt the defensive 
measures necessary for the self,defence of the unit or force.,,98 
Unfortunately, the participants were unable to be more concrete about this 
issue. There is, however, another rule in the San Remo Manual that is of help 
in evaluating the legality of defensive measures taken in neutral waters, 
including neutral international straits. Paragraph 22 provides: 
Should a belligerent State be in violation of the regime of neutral waters ... the 
neutral State is under an obligation to take the measures necessary to terminate 
the violation. If the neutral State fails to terminate the violation of its neutral 
waters by a belligerent, the opposing belligerent must so notify the neutral State 
and give the neutral State a reasonable time to terminate the violation by the 
belligerent. If the violation of the neutrality of the State by the belligerent 
constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the security of the opposing 
belligerent and the violation is not terminated, then that belligerent may, in the 
absence of any feasible and timely alternative, use such force as is strictly 
necessary to respond to the threat posed by the violation. 
Accordingly, belligerent warships and military aircraft transiting a neutral 
international strait are allowed to take all measures necessary for self,defense 
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as acknowledged by customary international law if the neutral littoral State is 
either unwilling or unable to terminate the violation of its neutrality. Thus, the 
sovereignty of the neutral State and the belligerents' interests are equally met. 
Neutral International Straits to Which the Right of Transit Passage Does Not 
Apply. The rules and principles dealt with so far undoubtedly apply to 
international straits overlapped by the territorial seas of neutral coastal States. 
However, according to the LOS Convention the right of transit passage is not 
valid in all straits which-either in general or in specific maritime 
parlance-are used for international navigation. The exceptions have 
repercussions for the law of maritime neutrality, because they concern sea areas 
covered by the territorial sovereignty of the neutral coastal State. 
Exceptions to the Right of Transit Passage According to the LOS Convention. 
Straits used for international navigation between a part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea or historical bay of a foreign 
State are governed only by the right of innocent passage.1OO Although 
according to Article 45.2 of the LOS Convention there "shall be no suspension 
of innocent passage through such straits," the coastal State will be in a position 
to impose stricter limitations on international navigation than if the transit 
passage regime applied. The decisive differences are that foreign submarines 
may not transit such straits submerged and that foreign aircraft are prohibited 
from entering the airspace above them, unless the coastal State explicitly 
consents. 
Another explicit exception to the transit passage regime is laid down in 
Article 36 of the LOS Convention; it applies "if there exists through the strait a 
route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar 
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics." 
If an international strait is not-at least in part-completely overlapped by the 
territorial sea of the coastal States, ships and aircraft of all nations enjoy 
freedom of navigation and overflight in the remaining corridor even if an 
exclusive economic zone has been proclaimed. Such a situation is encountered 
in all straits whose breadth exceeds twenty~four nautical miles measured from 
properly drawn baselines. In straits whose breadth is less than twenty~four 
nautical miles there may also exist a high seas (or EEZ) corridor if the coastal 
States claim a territorial sea ofless than twelve nautical miles.101 Within those 
portions of the strait that are part of the coastal State's territorial sea, ships and 
aircraft only enjoy a suspendable right of innocent passage.102 
At first glance, the provisions of Article 36 seem rather clear. However, 
their practical application sometimes poses difficult problems. It needs to be 
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emphasized that the existence of a high seas or EEZ corridor as such does not 
exclude the applicability of the transit passage regime. The route must be "of 
similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical 
characteristics." If the remaining corridor does not meet these qualifications, 
the transit passage regime will also apply in straits not overlapped by the 
territorial sea of the bordering State.I03 But when is the corridor "of similar 
convenience"? In view of the wording of Article 36, this will not be the case if 
the navigational channel is not identical with the remaining corridor or when 
transiting through the corridor would result in navigational difficulties or a loss 
of time.104 
The latter aspect is also of importance with regard to overflight. If the 
corridor, due to the geographic configuration of the bordering coastlines, often 
changes its direction, military aircraft in particular will hardly be able to follow 
it exactly. This problem is not resolved by demanding that pilots decelerate, 
because, should they do so, their aircraft would be more vulnerable to surface 
to air missiles. Hence, the coastal State will have to tolerate flights over those 
parts of the strait overlapped by its territorial sea.I05 
Of course, some will counter these arguments by denying a neutral State's 
duty to have regard for belligerent military considerations. The neutral coastal 
State is, they would argue, obliged to tolerate transit through and over its 
territorial sea only if necessary for the safety of international air and sea traffic. 
If a belligerent is not prepared to assume the risks resulting, e.g., from slow 
flight, it must simply refrain from using the neutral airspace. The 
counterarguments have some validity in time of peace. Although the 
relationship between belligerents and neutrals is to a considerable extent 
governed by the law of peace, the modification thereof by the laws of neutrality 
may not be ignored. The object and purpose of the law of neutrality is to protect 
the neutral against the effects of hostilities and to prevent it from becoming 
(directly) involved in the armed conflict. The parties to the conflict will 
scarcely be willing to limit their operations to corridors that are not of "similar 
convenience." The neutral State would be obliged to react, possibly by military 
means, to the use of its airspace. Of course, there remains no specific rule of 
maritime neutrality which would permit belligerent aircraft to overfly neutral 
territorial seas in those international straits through which there are high seas 
or exclusive economic zone routes of similar convenience as defined by Article 
36. However, functional considerations seem to justify the conclusion that 
belligerent warships and military aircraft are entitled to transit such straits in 
and over the neutral coastal State's territorial sea.106 
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The third kind of strait excluded from the application of the regime of 
transit passage is dealt with in Article 38.1 of the LOS Convention. This 
exception, generally called the Messina Exception because it has its origin in a 
corresponding endeavour by Italy, applies to a strait that "is formed by an island 
of a State bordering the strait and its mainland."lo7 In such a case, transit 
passage shall not apply "if there exists seaward of the island a route through the 
high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with 
respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics."l08 However, 
according to Article 45 all ships enjoy the right of innocent passage in such 
straits. Although States bordering a strait like that of Messina will regularly try 
to exclude the right of transit passage, they will be entitled to do so only if the 
conditions laid down in Article 38.1 are met.lOO For example, even in the Strait 
of Messina there is no unlimited right to prevent ships and aircraft from 
transiting.110 Othenvise, ships and aircraft travelling from France to the 
southern and southeastern Mediterranean would be compelled to take the 
route around Sicily, which is about sixty nautical miles longer than the passage 
through the Strait of Messina. It can hardly be said that that route is of "similar 
convenience." 
Straits Governed by Long~Standing International Conventions. Finally-and 
this is a continuing cause for dispute-according to Article 35(c) of the LOS 
Convention the regime of transit passage does not apply to straits "in which 
passage is regulated in whole or in part by long~standing international 
conventions in force specifically relating to such straits."l11 There is no 
indication in the Convention as to which straits qualify for this exception. Still, 
according to the view taken here, only six international straits, if any at all, are 
regulated by such conventions: ll2 the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and 
Dardanelles), the Strait of Magellan, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Sound and the 
Belts, and the Aland Islands Strait.1l3 
It is beyond any doubt that in the Turkish Straits the right of transit passage 
does not apply, 114 for there are specific rules with regard to transit passage in the 
Montreux Convention of20 July 1936.115 In time of peace and in time of war, 
merchant vessels of all nations enjoy an unrestricted right of passage through 
the Dardanelles, the Marmara Sea, and the Bosporus.116 Article 23 limits the 
right of overflight to civil aircraft. Accordingly, military aircraft may not enter 
airspace above the Straits, either in time of peace or war. 
Special provisions apply to warships; further, the Convention distinguishes 
between warships belonging to States bordering the Turkish Straits and those 
belonging to other States.ll7 In principle, all warships are obliged to inform the 
Turkish authorities in advance, by notification of the names, types, and 
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numbers of the ships and of the date of passage.us Prior to passage the 
commander must also provide information about the nature of weapons aboard 
his ship. No more than nine ships may transit the Straits simultaneously. The 
aggregate tonnage of the ships may not exceed fifteen thousand tons unless 
they belong to a State bordering the Straits. If they exceed fifteen thousand 
tons, the ships may only transit alone or in the company of two cruisers (or 
destroyers). The total tonnage of warships in the Black Sea belonging to States 
not bordering that sea may amount to thirty thousand tons (or, in the event of 
significant disparity between fleets, a maximum of forty,five thousand tons). 
All warships transiting the Straits are prohibited from launching their aircraft. 
Submarines may not transit, unless they belong to bordering States and 
originate from areas beyond the Black Sea. Such submarines may only transit 
alone, during the day, and on the surface. Laid down in Articles 10 through 18, 
these provisions on warships apply both in time of peace and, ifT urkey is not a 
belligerent, in time of war.119 Warships belonging to the parties to an 
international armed conflict are strictly prohibited from transiting the Turkish 
Straits.120 
While the Turkish Straits do indeed match the conditions laid down in 
Article 35(c) of the LOS Convention, the other straits mentioned do noti 
however, they clearly qualify as being governed by "long,standing international 
conventions" in the sense of that provision. Freedom of navigation in the Strait 
of Magellan is dealt with in the Boundary Treaty between Argentina and Chile 
of 23 July 1881.121 That treaty was concluded due to an arbitral award by 
Edward VII. According to Article V, the Strait of Magellan is permanently 
neutralized, and ships of all nations enjoy an unrestricted right of freedom of 
navigation. In Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 18 October 1984, 
Argentina and Chile, explicitly referring to the treaty of 1881, agreed in as 
follows:122 
The delimitation herein agreed in no way alters what is laid down in the 
Boundary Treaty of 1881, whereby the Strait of Magellan is neutralized in 
perpetuity and unrestricted navigation in it is assured for the flags of all 
nations .... 
Since there is no provision in these treaties specifically regulating "passage," 
some argue that Article 35 (c) is not applicable and that therefore the Magellan 
Strait is governed by the right of transit passage.l23 However, the missing 
reference to "passage" should not be overestimated. Rather, "navigation" is to 
be understood as comprising passage.124 This is one of the reasons why, for 
example, the United States acknowledges that the Strait of Magellan falls 
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under the 35 (c) exception.125 Thus, according the Treaty of 1881 (not Article 
38 of the LOS Convention), warships and merchant vessels of all nations enjoy 
an unlimited right of passage through the Strait of Magellan at all times. 
Since there is no reference to aircraft in either the 1881 or 1984 treaties, it is 
a matter of contention whether aircraft of all nations also enjoy the right of 
non,suspendable overflight. Although Argentina and Chile are seemingly 
unwilling to accept such a right, in light of long,standing practice a rule of 
customary law to that effect has evolved.126 Therefore, it may be concluded 
that although the regime of transit passage as such does not apply to the Strait 
of Magellan, ships (according to the Treaty of1881) and aircraft (according to 
customary law) of all nations enjoy the right of non,suspendable passage and 
overflight. 
As regards the Strait of Gibraltar, the passage of ships is subject to 
agreements between France, Spain, and the United Kingdom of 1904, 1907, 
and 1912.127 There is, however, no indication in those treaties that the parties 
also intended either to guarantee or exclude passage by ships of third StatesPS 
When they were concluded, the high seas, including the high seas corridor 
between Gibraltar and North Africa, could not be made subject to bilateral or 
multilateral international treaties. Nevertheless, Spain has repeatedly 
maintained that the Strait of Gibraltar is regulated by the Declaration of 1904 
and is therefore exempted from at least the right of overflight. 129 It is interesting 
to note that during the Yom Kippur War (1973), U.S. military aircraft on 
flights from the Azores to Israel scrupulously kept to the airspace above the 
high seas corridor between the former three,nautical,mile territorial seas of 
Spain and Morocco. 130 In 1973, however, the regime of transit passage was still 
unknown. Four years after the adoption of the LOS Convention, U.S. military 
aircraft launched from Britain to attack targets in Libya flew over the Strait of 
Gibraltar. The United States justified the overflight based on the Convention's 
right of transit passage.l3l Hence, neither the treaties referred to nor State 
practice allows the conclusion that the Strait of Gibraltar is a strait within the 
meaning of Article 35 (C).132 So far, only Spain has taken a view to the contrary. 
Since it did not protest the 1986 overflight by U.S. military aircraft, the Spanish 
position has no influence on the legal characterization of the Strait of 
Gibraltar. 
With respect to passage through the Baltic Straits (Sound, Great and Little 
Belt), it may be doubted here too whether it is regulated by "long,standing 
international conventions." Denmark has repeatedly referred to the Treaty on 
the Redemption of Sound Dues of 14 March 1857133 and to the U.S.,Danish 
Treaty of 1 April 1857134 to maintain that those straits are not governed by 
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Article 34 ff. of the LOS Convention.135 Accordingly, by the Ordinance of 27 
February 1976 Denmark has subjected transit by warships and overflight by 
military aircraft to prior notice and prior admittance respectively. While in 
principle all States observe these regulations,136 they have emphasized that the 
1857 treaties were never applied to warships.137 Rauch takes the position that 
passage in the Baltic Straits is not regulated, either in whole or in part, by the 
treaty of 14 March 1857. He therefore maintains that the straits are governed 
by the right of transit passage in accordance with Part III of the LOS 
Convention.138 Indeed, the Treaty on the Redemption of Sound Dues contains 
only an indirect reference to the customary freedom of navigation. On the 
other hand, in the U.S.,Danish Treaty of 1 April 1857 "the free and 
unencumbered navigation of American vessels, through the Sound and the 
Belts forever" is guaranteed. Ultimately, there is little need for a final solution 
to this problem, since such a solution would not clarify a situation in which 
Denmark was neutral. Even if one were prepared to characterize the Danish 
Straits as regulated by "long,standing conventions," doing so would not 
necessarily imply that a neutral Denmark would be entitled to close them to 
belligerent warships and military aircraft. Instead, the practice of Scandinavian 
States already referred to above justifies the assumption that Denmark will 
keep its straits open in the event of neutrality.139 As regards Sweden and transit 
through the 0resund, that assumption is strengthened by the Swedish 
Ordinance of 17 June 1982, which expressly excludes warships and military 
aircraft from the right of transit passage restrictions.140 This means that 
Sweden, although considering the 0resund a historical strait,141 acknowledges 
the continuing validity of the right of passage and overflight by belligerent 
warships and military aircraft in naval armed conflict. Hence, the Danish 
restrictions on passage and overflight do not apply when the bordering States 
are neutrals. 
Finally, Sweden142 and Finland143 maintain that the Aland Islands Strait, in 
light of the 3 March 1918 Treaty of Brest,Litovsk and the 20 October 1921 
Treaty Concerning the Non,Fortification and Neutralization of the Aland 
Islands, is excluded from the regime of transit passage laid down in Part III of 
the LOS Convention. Indeed, according to Article 5 of the 1921 treaty the 
right of passage is not restricted but is, instead, subject to the rules of 
international law and to international practice. The question, therefore, is 
whether a specific regulation of passage exists. In that regard, Rauch takes the 
following position: 
Unless one is to throw overboard all rules of treaty interpretation as codified in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, it is impossible to 
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construe Art. 5 of the Aland Convention as a treaty provision "regulating" 
passage through that strait.l44 
Obviously, Rauch is in favor of a very narrow understanding of the notion 
"regulated" in Article 35 (c) of the LOS Convention, since he is prepared to 
accept only explicit restrictions or prohibitions. This notion, however, need not 
necessarily be understood so restrictively. It may well suffice that the provisions 
in question deal with passage at all. Hence, there are good reasons to maintain 
that passage through the Aland Straits is free only to the extent commonly 
understood in 1921. Thus, ships of all nations enjoy the right of passage, whereas 
aircraft are not entitled to overflight. Still, the Aland Straits may not be 
completely excluded from the regime of transit passage. In the treaty of 1921 the 
breadth of the territorial sea is fixed at three nautical miles. Since that treaty is 
still in force and has not been modified, a right of transit passage at least exists in 
the sea areas beyond the three,nautical,mile territorial seas. 
Conclusion 
Practice with regard to international straits has shown that States bordering 
an international strait have continuously endeavored to assimilate the sea 
areas concerned into their territorial sea or even internal waters. The majority 
of these endeavors are inconsistent with the legal regime of international straits 
as it has been developed by State practice and especially by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In and over international straits a right of 
transit passage exists that shall not be impeded, whether in time of peace or 
armed conflict. Of course, a belligerent is not obliged to leave unmolested 
enemy vessels and aircraft transiting a strait overlapped by its territorial sea. 
Neutral shipping and neutral aircraft, however, continue to enjoy the right of 
transit passage. Neutral States bordering an international strait may prescribe 
and enforce only regulations that are in conformity with the respective 
provisions of Part III of the LOS Convention. Moreover, they are obliged to 
counter any abuse of the neutral status of the respective waters by any of the 
belligerents. They may, however, neither suspend nor in any other manner 
impede the right of transit passage, even though observing the principle of 
impartiality. 
Of course, the law of maritime neutrality is far from settled. However, as 
regards the legal status of neutral international straits, it is here maintained 
that there exists a consensus adequately balancing the interests involved: 
neutral States are protected from the adverse effects of the hostilities, and 
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belligerents continue to enjoy the degree of mobility that is essential for the 
success of their naval operations. In order to preserve that compromise it is 
necessary to counter any effort aimed at a further restriction of the freedom of 
navigation and overflight in and over international straits. Since international 
straits are highly important traffic ways, every interested State should, starting 
in time of peace, take all feasible measures in accordance with international 
law to prevent any infringement of the legal regime of those sea areas. It may be 
emphasized that to secure effectively the international legal status of 
international straits it is in no way sufficient merely to rely upon one "lead 
nation." Rather, all States concerned must, individually and collectively, take 
the steps necessary. 
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THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 18 (1985). 
33. Especially by Spain (LOS Convention, II Off. Rec. 136 ff; XN id. at 149 ff.; XVI id. at 
243 ff.); Denmark (II, id. at 124); Algeria (id. at 13 7 ff.); Albania (id. at 139); Kuwait (id.); and 
the former People's Republic of Yemen (id. at 142). 
34. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, HUMANITARIAN 
LAw IN ARMED CONFLICT-MANuAL (1992) [hereinafter ZDv 15/2). 
35. In a background paper on naval mining of January 1978 (Forudsretninger for dansk 
sominekrigsforelse, s. III 5), the authors come to the following conclusion: "Relative to third 
parties, such minefields may be justified under the principles of international law relating to 
self-defence. " 
36. The distinction sometimes found in the literature between neutral warships and 
merchant vessels is made without any justification and can, therefore, be ignored. See Ronzitti, 
Crisis, supra note II, at 20 ff. 
37. See NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 9.2.3; Hoog, Mines, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 283,284 (Bernhardt ed., 1982) [Encyclopedia hereinafter E.P.I.L.). 
38. For a view to that effect, see Bothe, Neutrality in Naval Warfare, supra note 11, at 403; 
Ronntti, Passage through International Straits in Time of International Armed Conflict, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAw AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION: EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERTO 
AGO 363, 377 (1987). 
39. Note that Articles 37ff. of the LOS Convention contain no provision on submarines. 
However, according to Article 39.1 (c), ships and aircraft while exercising the tight of transit 
passage are obliged only "to refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal 
modes of continuous and expeditious transit." Hence, submarines are free to transit 
international straits submerged, since that is their normal mode of operation. See Lowe, The 
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 
supra note 13, at 109, 122; Reisman, supra note 29, at 62 ff. (1980); Moore, Regime, supra note 27, 
at 117 ff. (1980). For the origin of Article 39 and its strategic implications, see Clove, Submarine 
Navigation in International Straits: A Legal Perspective, 39 NAVAL 1. REv. 103 (1990); Burke, 
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Submerged Passage through Straits, 52 WASH. L. REv. 193 (1977); Grunawalt, United States Policy 
on International Straits, 18 OCEAN DEY. & INT'L L.j. 445 (1987). 
40. For the technical aspects of anti-submarine warfare, see jOPP, MARINE 200, at 127 ff., 
153 ff. (1989). 
41. As early as 1954 Baxter came to the following conclUsion: "There is some basis for 
concluding that a belligerent is under an obligation to provide passage, subject to reasonable 
measures of security and control such as compulsory pilotage and navigation by day, to neutral 
vessels and that it may completely block passage of a strait only as a last resort in the most urgent 
and compelling of circumstances." Baxter, supra note II, at 204. Of course, this conclusion was 
related to innocent passage, since transit passage was still unknown in 1954. For a contrary View, 
see RAUCH, supra note II, at 45. Rauch merely acknowledges a belligerent right to subject 
neutral shipping to "reasonable measures of security and control." This conclusion is, however, 
not drawn from State practice but only founded upon the judgement in the Corfu Channel case. 
42. For a characterization to that effect, see Heintschel von Heinegg, The Current State of 
International Prize Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLlCf 5, 25 ff. 
(Post ed., 1994). 
43. Note that there exists no right of overflight in straits governed by Articles 36 and 38.1, 
first alternative. 
44. NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 9.2.3.3. 
45. In this context, it suffices to mention Articles 34 and 39 of the 1923 Hague Rules on 
Aerial Warfare, which can be considered customary law. See SPETZLER, LUFTKRIEG UND 
MENSCHLICHKEIT 156 (1956). For a more cautious view, see Bierzanek, Commentary on the 1923 
Hague Rules, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note II, at 396, 404 ff. 
46. See CANADIAN ARMED FORCES, LAW OF ARMED CONFLlCf MANUAL (Second 
Drafr), § 1521 (n.d.), [hereinafrer CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL I; Ronzitti, Crisis, supra note II, 
at 25. This does not prejudice the legal status of civilian passenger aircraft. 
47. See the ICAO Report, Nov. 7, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 900 (1989); Friedman, The Vincennes 
Incident, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1989, at 74; Evans, Vincennes-A Case Study, U.S. 
NAVAL INST. PROC., Aug. 1993, at 49. 
48. For example, the Swedish Ordinance of 1966, supra note 20. 
49. Statement by the Swedish delegate during the third session of the second 
subcommittee, july 27, 1907, printed in NIEMEYER, supra note 15, at 1009. 
50. Reprinted in id. at 922. 
51. While the Ottoman delegate referred to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the 
japanese delegate stated, "Le Gouvernementjaponais ne prenait aucun engagement concernant 
les d6troits qui s6parent les nombreuses iies ou liots qui composent l'empire japonais et qui ne 
sont que des parties int6grantes de l'empire." Id. at 893. 
52. Report of Ocr. 9, 1907, reprinted in id. at 893. 
53. In 1927 Jessup maintained that the applicability of the right of innocent passage to 
international straits "requires no supporting argument or citation." He conceded, however, that 
there was no general agreement with regard to warships. See JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL 
WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDlCfION 120 (1927). 
54. The same view was taken by Wehberg, Das Seekriegsrecht, in V HANDBUCH DES 
VOLKERRECHTS 418 (Stier-Somlo ed., 1915). Rauch draws a different conclusion from the 
conference history: "From the opinions expressed, it seemed that a neutral State may forbid even 
innocent passage through limited parts of its territorial waters so far as that was considered 
necessary to maintain its neutrality, but that this prohibition could not extend to straits uniting 
two open seas." RAUCH, supra note 11, at 41. Rauch also refers to the statement of the 
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Norwegian delegate concerning the right of innocent passage in time of war. However, that 
statement contains nothing in relation to international straits; it is proof only for the customary 
character of Article 10 of Hague Convention XIII. ROnzitti, Crisis, supra note II, at 19. 
55. See the references in WHITEMAN, 11 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 ff. (1968) 
(on State practice during armed conflicts before 1945). 
56. The respective announcements and proclamations are printed in 
REICHS-MARINE-AMT, SEEKRlEGSRECHT 1M WELTKRlEG (SAMMLUNG DlPLOMATISCHER 
NOTEN UND ANDERER URKUNDEN. ZUSAMMENGESTELLT 1M AUFTRAGE DES 
STAATSSEKRETARS DES REICHS-MARlNE-AMTSj, 3 vols. (1916); and in OKM, URKUNDEN ZUM 
SEEKRIEGSRECHT, supra note 19. See also, RAUCH, supra note II, at 32 ff. 
57. 188 L.N.T.S. 294-331. 
58. See Articles 2.3 and 8.1 respectively for Denmark and Sweden. See also Bring, 
Commentary on !he 1938 S!ockholm Deciara!ion, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 
II, at 839,891, who concludes that "the Danish and Swedish Regulations implicitly confirmed 
the traditional right of unimpeded passage of foreign warships in time of war through the Baltic 
Straits." 
59. Note that the Harvard Draft of 1939 contains no explicit prohibition on closing neutral 
international straits. There is only one reference to straits in the commentary on Article 25. That 
commentary is, however, restricted to the Turkish Straits, the Suez, and the Panama Canal. 
Otherwise, it is stated that the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice (PCI]), in the case of 
the Wimbledon, ruled that the use of international waterways is in accordance with neutrality. 
60. See Memorandum by the German Foreign Office of 6 June 1941, reprin!ed in OKM, 
URKUNDEN ZUM SEEKRlEGSRECHT, supra note 19, no. 432. 
61. For the few examples ofbelligerent warships transiting neutral international straits, see 
O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 99 ff. (1975). 
62. See the Swedish Ordinance of 1966, supra note 20, and the Danish Ordinance of27 
February 1976 concerning admittance of foreign w~ships and military aircraft (U.N. 
STILEGSER.B/19, 142). The Swedish Ordinance was revised by the Ordinance of 17 June 1982 
concerning Intervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the Event of Violations of Swedish 
Territory in Peacetime and in Neutrality (Swedish Code of Statutes 1982: 756). The restrictions 
of the transit right of foreign warships and military aircraft does not apply in the Oresund, where 
no prior notice is necessary. See also RAUCH, supra note 11, at 43 ff. 
63. RAUCH, supra note 11, at 44. Rauch believes that "taken together, doctrine and State 
practice would seem to justify the conclusion that if the littoral States are neutral, innocent 
passage of belligerent warships through international straits in time of war may be interfered with 
only in exceptional cases." See also 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (7th ed., 
Lauterpacht ed., 1963), who, by reference to an obi!er dic!um of the PCI] in the Wimbledon case, 
claims an unrestrictable right of transit passage. The PCI] had mentioned "the general opinion 
according to which, when an artiflcial waterway connecting rwo open seas has been permanently 
dedicated to the use of the whole world, such waterway is assimilated to natural straits in the 
sense that even the passage of a belligerent man-of-war does not compromise the neutrality of 
the sovereign State under whose jurisdiction the waters in question lie." P.C.I.J. Ser. A., No.1, 
28. A more cautious approach is taken by Castren, who states, "Transit by belligerent warships 
may probably not, however, be prevented in those straits connecting different parts of the high 
seas where the territorial waters of one or several neutral coastal States meet." CASTREN, THE 
PREsENT LAw OFWARANDNEUTRAUTY 518 (1954). 
64. In Article 17 ofits draft (U.N. Doc. N3159), the International Law Commission (ILC) 
had proposed the following wording: "There must be no suspension of the innocent passage of 
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foreign vessels through straits nonnally used for international navigation between two parts of 
the high seas." Hence, in the final wording there is no longer a reference to the "normal use" for 
international navigation. 
65. See, inter alia, Alexander, International Straits, supra note 13, at 97 ff.; O'CONNELL, 
INFLUENCE, supra note 61, at 103 ff. 
66. 1 O'CONNELL, LAw OF THE SEA, supra note 29, at 317; KOH, supra note 29, at 27; 
Reisman, supra note 29, at 59. 
67. Note that the right of transit passage does not apply to internal waters within a strait 
"except where the establishment of a straight baseline ... has the effect of enclosing as internal 
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such." LOS Convention, supra note 2, 
art. 35 (a). Although the legal status of internal waters within an international strait is of special 
relevance for the Northeast and Northwest passages, the status of these sea areas is still unclear; 
see the exchange of notes between the United States and the former USSR in DEPT. OF STATE, 
LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, at 68 ff. (1992). See also Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest 
Passage Dispute: A Reassessment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.]. 331 (1993). 
Another open question is the legal status of the entries to an international strait if they are 
completely overlapped by the littoral States' territorial seas. This is the case in the Strait of 
Magellan and in the Beagle Channel. It follows, however, from the object and purpose of the 
right of transit passage that there also exists a right of passage and overflight that may not be 
hampered or suspended. This is the position taken by the U.S. Department of State vis-a-vis 
Chile and Argentina. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, supra, at 63. 
68. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 38.1. For an analysis, see Young, The Evolution 0/ a 
Proposed New Navigation Rule: The "Duty Not to Impede," 17]. MAR. L. & COM. 119 (1986). 
69. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 39.1 (a-c). 
70. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 20 
October 1972; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 
of 2 November 1973; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 
1 November 1974. 
71. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 39.2(a). Note that State aircraft "will normally 
comply with s.uch safety measures." Id., art. 39.3 (a). 
72. Id., art. 41.1. 
73. Id., art. 42.2. 
74. Bryde, Militiirische und sicherheitspolitische Implikationen der neuen Seerechtskonvention, in 
DAS NEUE SEERECHT 151,176 (Delbruck ed., 1984). 
75. See, inter alia, ROACH & SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 177 ff. (66 
International Law Studies, 1994); MONcH, DIE REGIME INTERNATlONALER MEERENGEN VOR 
DEM HINTERGRUND DER DRITTEN UN-SEERECHTSKONFERENZ 127 ff. (1982) (on the 
customary character of the provisions). 
76. Alexander, supra note 13, at91; RAUCH, supra note 11, at48; Robertson, supra note 28, 
at 843 ff.; Moore, supra note 27, at 95; Clove, supra note 39, at 108 ff.; Burke, supra note 39, at 
193; Bryde, supra note 74, at 176 E, 182 ff; MONcH, supra note 75, at 111 ff. 
77. Alexander, International Straits, supra note 13, at 93; RAUCH, PROTOCOL 
ADDITlONAL, supra note 11, at 45 ff.; ROBERTSON, supra note 14, at 21 f.; Dinstein, supra 
note 37, at 19 f.; MONcH, supra note 75, at 44; Harlow, The Law o/Neutrality at Sea/or the 80's 
and Beyond, 3 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L.]. 42, 50 (1984); Grunawalt, Belligerent and Neutral Rights 
in Straits and Archipelagos, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 137 (Clingan ed., 
1988); Ronzitti, Passage, supra note 38, at 366 ff. See also para. 29 of the San Remo Manual: 
"Neutral States may not suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede the right of transit passage .... " 
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SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw ApPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICfS AT SEA , 
para. 29 (Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). Only Lowe seems to have doubts as regards the validity of 
the right of transit passage during armed conflict. Lowe, supra note 39, at 123. 
78. "Customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
provides that belligerent and neutral surface ships, submarines, and aircraft have a right of transit 
passage through, over, and under all straits used for international navigation. Neutral nations 
cannot suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede this right of transit passage through international 
straits." NWP I-14M, supra note 9 § 7.3.5. "The airspace above neutral international straits ... 
remains open at all times to belligerent aircraft, including armed military aircraft, engaged in 
transit ... passage." Id., § 7.3.7. 
79. "Warships and military aircraft of a belligerent state may exercise the right of transit 
passage, that is, of essentially unimpeded passage or overflight •.. through certain straits where 
the transit passage applies." CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL, supra note 46, § 1511.2. 
80. "While transit passage through international straits ... include [s I the right of overflight 
and the right of passage in submerged mode." ZDv 15/2, supra note 34, § 1126. 
81. In the Danish background paper, supra note 35, the authors consider the legal status 
unclear. It must be kept in mind, however, that that paper was written in 1978. Moreover, it is 
made clear that "in the case of international straits the legality of a minefield will presumably 
depend on whether passage of the straits by the belligerents is 'innocent' in relation to the peace, 
order and security of the coastal State." 
82. Harlow, supra note 77, at 50. 
83. RAUCH, supra note 11, at 46. 
84. NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 7.3.5. "The rights of transit passage ... applicable to 
internarional straits ... in peacerime continue to apply in times of armed conflict. The laws and 
regulations of States bordering straits ... relating to transit passage ... adopted in accordance 
with general international law remain applicable." SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, para. 27. 
85. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 40. See also, Alexander, supra note 13, at 93. 
86. "A belligerent in transit passage through, under and over a neutral international strait 
... is required to proceed without delay, to reftain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the neutral littoral ... State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and otherwise 
refrain from any hostile actions or other activities not incident to their transit." SAN REMO 
MANUAL, supra note 77, para. 30. See also, Ronzitti, supra note 38, at 369 f. 
87. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, paras. 15-17; NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 7.3.5; 
ZDv 15/2, supra note 34, § 1118 ff. For the Egyptian action taken in the strait ofBab al Mandab, 
see O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 101 ff. 
88. Alexander, supra note 13, at 93. 
89. Hence, there is no difference with the applicable peacetime rule. In view of the 
vulnerability of surfaced submarines, it would be unrealistic to prohibit submerged transit. 
Moreover, the neutral State is thus not obliged to monitor the strait, which would necessitate the 
use of expensive equipment. See Harlow, supra note 77, at 51 (1984); Ronzitti, supra note 38, at 
370 ff. 
90. CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL, supra note 46, § 1511.2. 
91. NWP 1-14M,supranote9, § 7.3.5. 
92. Id., § 7.3.7.1. 
93. "Belligerents passing through, under and over neutral straits ... are permitted to take 
defensive measures consistent with their security, including launching and recovery of aircraft, 
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screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance." SAN REMO MANUAL, 
supra note 77, para. 30. 
94. This may also be based upon the judgement of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, 
because the Court did not consider the transit of British warships, which had been in a state of 
readiness, contrary to international law . 1949 ICJ Rep. 1 ff. See also, Harlow, supra note 77, at 51: 
Because straits are natural "choke points," no naval commander can pass through without 
being prepared to respond to hostile action. In the regime of transit passage, the concept 
of peacetime transit in the "normal mode" includes the use of routine defensive measures 
such as air and surface search radar, and sonar. In wartime, the use of such defensive 
measures, which do not threaten the coastal state or its resource interests, is made even 
more necessary by the heightened potential for imminent attack. Attempts by neutrality 
laws to restrict such measures would be highly unrealistic and possibly counterproductive 
since they could breed disrespect for the laws in general. 
95. For example, common Article 8.2 of the 1938 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57, 
provides that" [al ircraft carried on board belligerent warships shall not leave such vessels while 
in ••• territorial waters." There is no indication that this rule is not to apply in international 
straits. 
96. See O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 103 ff. 
97. See also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, para. 30. "Belligerents in transit ... 
passage may not, however, conduct offenSive operations against enemy forces, nor use such 
neutral waters as a place of sanctuary or as a base of operations." 
98. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, explanation of para. 30.1. 
99. RAUCH, supra note II, at 49. The differences between international straits where the 
right of transit passage applies and those where it does not apply are ignored by Ronzitri. See, e.g., 
Passage, supra note 38, at 363 ff. 
100. LOS Convenrion, supra note 2, art. 45. See Alexander, International Straits, supra note 
13, at 99, 103. 
101. For example, Rnland still claims a territorial sea of four nautical miles in breadth. See 
Law No. 463 of 18 August 1956j LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 29, No.2, March 1985. Therefore, 
in the Gulf of Finland there remains an open corridor. The example given by Alexander 
(International Straits, supra note 13, at 100) concerning the Bass Strait between Australia and 
Tasmania is not valid any longerj on 20 November 1990 Australia extended its territorial sea 
from three to twelve nautical miles. See the Statement by the Permanent Representative of 
Australia to the UN of 29 November 1990, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 8, No. 18, 
June 1991. 
102. Alexander, supra note 13, at 100. 
103. RAUCH, supra note II, at 47 f.j Alexander, supra note 13, at 99 f. 
104. This is the case if the breadth of the remaining corridor is not sufficient for the safety of 
navigation. An example given by Alexander (ieI. at 100) is the Bahamas. If the Bahamas 
extended the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, the breadth of the remaining corridor in the 
Providence Channel would measure 0.25 nautical miles. However, IMO requires a breadth of 
three nautical miles in order to guarantee as safe a passage as possible. 
105. RAUCH, supra note II, at 48. Rauch also refers to strategic submarines, which might be 
unable to keep to the corridor simply because it is not deep enough. 
106. leI. at 48. 
107. The Strait of Messina between the Italian mainland and Sicily has a breadth of two 
nautical miles. For the Italian position during the Conference, see the statement by the Italian 
delegate reprinted in UNCLOS III, Off. Rec. 130. See also MONcH, MEERENGEN, supra note 81. 
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108. Italy was supported by the British delegation. See UNCLOS, II Off. Rec., Vol. 125. 
According to the British view, the following straits fulfil the conditions of Article 38.1., LOS 
Convention: the Pendand Firth south of the Orkney Islands, and the passage between Cornwall 
and the Scilly Islands. Hansard, 484 H.L., Feb. 5, col. 382. 
109. For further examples (like Messina), see Alexander, supra note 13, at 101. 
110. As of 3 April 1985, Italy has subjected international navigation to a number of 
restrictions. Oil tankers of more than ten thousand tons may no longer transit the strait. Oil 
tankers of more than five thousand tons and all other ships of more than ten thousand tons are 
assigned to compulsory piloting. The United States, by a diplomatic note of AprilS, 1985, has 
emphasized that it considers these measures only preliminary in character and not applicable to 
warships; LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, supra note 67, at 68. 
111. This provision has its origin in corresponding endeavours by Denmark, Finland, and 
Turkey. See UNCLOS, III, Off. Rec. 124 f., 132 f. 
112. In Article V, para. 2, of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979, reprinted in 
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICf AND ITS REsOLUTION: SELEcrED DOCU~1ENTS 218 ft: 
(Lapidoth & Hirsch eds., 1992), the two States have agreed as follows: "The Parties consider the 
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations tor 
unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect 
each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba." While in view of the date of signature, that treaty will hardly 
qualify as a "long-standing international convention," it is declaratory of the right of transit 
passage as laid down in the LOS Convention. See also MONcH, MEERENGEN, supra note 75, at 
53; Lapidoth, The Strait ofTiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and 
Israel, 77 AM]. INT'LL. 99 (1983). Amore cautious view is taken by Alexander, supra note 13, at 
102. See also Fink, The Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: The Practice of "Freedom of 
Navigation" after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 42 NAVAL L. REv. 121 (1995). 
113. See Moore, supra note 27, at 111 (1980); Alexander, supra note 13, at 101 ff.; Barabolja 
in 1 MODERNES SEEVOLKERRECHT 230 (1978); ROACH & SMITH, supra note 75, at 177 ff. 
114. Apart from the sources cited in note 113, see RAUCH, supra note II, at 50; LIUlTS IN 
THE SEAS, No. 112, supra note 67, at 65. There is good reason to believe that the delegates to 
UNCLOS III had these straits in mind. 
115. Reprinted in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note II, at 437. For an analysis, see 
Vignes, Commentary on the 1936 Montreux Convention, id.. at 468,472 ff.; MONcH, supra note 75, 
at 45 ff. 
116. Arts. 2-5. However, if Turkey is a belligerent, the Turkish Straits remain open for 
neutral merchant vessels only-which have to travel by daytime, must respect the sealanes 
designated by the Turkish authorities (art. 5.2), and are subjected to compulsory pilotage 
(art. 6). 
117. With regard to the passage of the Kiev in 1976, see Knight, The Kiev and the Turkish 
Straits, 71 AM.]. INT'L L 125 (1977); MONCH,supranote 75, at47 ff. For State practice during 
World War II, see WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 277 ff. 
118. For States bordering the Straits, the time limit is nine days; for all other States it is 
fifteen days (art. 13). 
119. If Turkey is a belligerent, art. 20 applies. For the wording, see supra, text following note 
10. 
120. Art. 19.2. Note, however, that this does not apply if, under the Covenant of the League 
of Nations or another pact of mutual assistance concluded within the League's framework, there 
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exist special obligations for Turkey. This presupposes that the State whose warships are to transit 
the Straits is the victim of an act of aggression. 
121. Martens, XVI NOUVEAU RECEUIL GENERAL 491 (1887). 
122. Reprinted in LAw OF THE SEA BULLETIN, No.4, Feb. 1985, at 50. 
123. That view is taken by RAUCH, supra note 11, at 52. 
124. Hence, MUnch in his analysis of the Treaty of 1881 comes to the conclusion that that 
treaty is a typical "long-standing convention in the sense of Article 35 (c) UNCLOS." MONcH, 
supra note 75, at 53. 
125. See the references in LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, supra note 67, at 67; ROACH & 
SMITH, supra note 75, at 194. See also note 36 to § 2.3.3.1 of the annotated version ofNWP 9, the 
predecessor ofNWP I-14M. 
126. The same position was taken by the U.S. Secretary of State in a statement of 21 
December 1984 (reprinted in LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112,supra note 67, at 67): 
This long-standing guarantee of free navigation for all vessels has been amply reinforced 
by practice, including practice recognizing the right of aircraft to overfly .... Essentially, 
the USG position would be that the 1881 Treaty and over a century of practice have 
imbued the Strait of Magellan with a unique regime of free navigation, including the right 
of overflight. That regime has been specifically recognized and reaffirmed by both 
Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Channel Treaty. Hence, the United States and other 
States may continue to exercise navigational and overflight rights and freedoms in 
accordance with this long-standing practice. 
127. London Declaration by France and the United Kingdom concerning Egypt and 
Morocco, art. VII, Apr. 8, 1904, reprinted in MARTENS, XXXII NOUVEAU RECEUIL GENERAL 18 
(1905). Spain acceded on Oct. 3, 1904. Franco-Spanish Declaration of Mutual Assistance in 
Mediterranean Affairs, May 16, 1907, 204 PARRY'S T.S. 353. Anglo-Spanish Declaration of 
Mutual Assistance in Mediterranean Affairs, May 16, 1907, id. at 179. Franco-Spanish Accord 
concerning Morocco, art. 6, Nov. 27, 1912,217 PARRY'S T.S. 288. Sometimes the Treaty of 
Utrecht of 13 July 1713, by which Philip V ceded Gibraltar to England, is referred to. However, 
art. 10 does not regulate the high seas corridor between Gibraltar and North Africa. Still, Spain 
maintains that the provisions of the LOS Convention on straits do not apply to that sea area. 
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